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Serial payers, serial losers?
The political economy of
Argentina’s public debt
Francisco J. Cantamutto and Daniel Ozarow
Abstract
A global neoliberal architecture has enabled many countries to increase their
public debts to meet their fiscal needs. But since 2008 a number of European
and North American economies have faced financial crises induced by unsustain-
able debts. This paper analyses the case of post-default Argentina since 2001, so as
to better comprehend the political economy of public debt, especially in cases
where governments are elected on anti-austerity platforms. Presidents Néstor
and Cristina Kirchner were committed to a debt-reduction policy, yet Argentina
faced a new, ‘selective’, default in 2014. This paper analyses how the country has
been trapped in a cycle of debt dependency, which can only be interrupted by a
comprehensive audit of the debt’s legitimacy followed by debt cancellation. Criti-
cal lessons are provided for other countries facing similar situations.
Keywords: Argentina; public debt; external debt; neoliberalism; default; vulture funds.
Once confined to non-industrialized economies in Africa, Southern Asia and
Latin America, today, in the post-global financial crisis milieu, sovereign debt
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crises are a spectre that haunts Europe and North America. They are imperilling
social cohesion in their societies in ways that were unimaginable just a few years
ago. Since 2008, several European countries – Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain,
Cyprus and Iceland – found themselves unable either to repay or refinance their
government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks. Each had to call upon the
European Central Bank (ECB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or
other European countries for assistance. Meanwhile, the US federal debt,
which continues to rise exponentially and now stands at US$16 trillion, has
been described as ‘unsustainable’ by the IMF (2015), and the United States
has narrowly avoided defaulting itself during several ‘debt ceiling crises’ in
recent years. Puerto Rico defaulted for the second time in several months in
January 2016 and faces the prospect of financial crisis. In Europe, political
responses to debt crises have seen left-wing governments elected that
promise to end externally imposed austerity programmes and negotiate debt
cancellation. We might instance Syriza’s shock rise to power in Greece, the
left-wing coalition containing Communists and Greens that entered govern-
ment in Portugal in 2015 and the possibility that a similar coalition including
anti-austerity parties (Podemos and the United Left) might assume office in
Spain by mid-2016. Sinn Fein became Ireland’s third largest party in a hung
parliament following the general election in February 2016, standing on a
similar platform. Yet the Greek experience suggests that even when debt can-
cellation is part of elected governments’ anti-austerity platforms, international
pressure and systemic processes mean that the logic of debt prevails. These
include new negotiations to obtain bail-out packages conditioned by structural
adjustment and market reforms. As Syriza’s failed attempt to manoeuvre away
from this institutionalized conditionality illustrated, seeking to break free is no
easy task.
This paper analyses the case study of post-default Argentina since 2001
(until recently the largest debt default in history), so as to better comprehend
the political economy of debt. It is especially relevant to cases where govern-
ments are elected on anti-austerity platforms and promise, and even achieve,
debt cancellation, as occurred under the presidencies of Néstor Kirchner
(2003–2007) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2008–2015). Whilst the
geopolitical contexts between Argentina and European Union or North Amer-
ican countries are clearly different, they share many of the threats posed to
indebted economies, including international financial institutions’ attempts
to impose neoliberal reforms as a condition of bail-out funds and speculative
attacks by hedge funds.1 Indeed, in Argentina’s case, following the 2001
default and significant debt write-downs, and despite being the fastest-
growing economy in the western hemisphere between 2003 and 2007
(World Bank, 2015) it controversially entered into selective (partial) debt
default again in 2014.
The paper argues that speculative finance capital is the direct beneficiary, in
this context, of a lack of regulatory controls within the economic, political and
legal architecture of the global capitalist system, with the recent intensification
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of hedge fund speculation on national debts in Argentina, Greece, Puerto Rico
and elsewhere being symptomatic of this. In Argentina’s case, the Kirchner gov-
ernments maintained an official ‘repay-as-much-as-possible’ negotiation strat-
egy under which its creditors became ‘partners’ in its economic recovery.
Under this seemingly win-win strategy, rates of repayment were partly
pegged to macroeconomic performance (GDP). Yet, paradoxically the debt
has continued to grow.
Some scholars argue that corruption or economic mismanagement is also
responsible for increases in public debt (Ferrer, 1997). Whilst these are contri-
buting factors, no academic source exists to evidence a systematic relationship
between the failings of individual agents and indebtedness. Instead our
approach is to explain that the national debt trajectory in Argentina’s case can
be better understood through the logic of debt within the financial system,
far outweighing such confounding influences in explaining tendencies
towards indebtedness.
Indeed, whilst favourable external conditions (namely high world commodity
prices and Chinese demand for soya) helped to explain Argentina’s post-2001
economic recovery, scholars have recognized the merit of domestic economic
policies in its achievement (Levy Yeyati & Valenzuela, 2007). Prudent public
debt management was central to this because the unavoidable 2001 default,
and subsequent debt restructuring in 2005, left surplus fiscal revenues available
for other policies, such as investment in public services, industrial subsidies and
social programmes. Yet in spite of this and the seemingly prudent ‘partners-in-
growth’ strategy by which debt would only be repaid so long as economic
growth permitted, the contradictions of such a policy are exposed in this
paper. The refusal to follow other economic paths (as explained in section 5)
is partially responsible for this. Argentina was not solely a victim of foreign con-
ditions or agents, as the outgoing Kirchner government affirmed; rather it too
shared culpability: while the government was able to negotiate some of the debt
characteristics (namely, its currency denomination, its weighting relative to
GDP and who its creditors were), it failed to change others, notably its legal
foundation. Thus, we argue that addressing the illegitimate character of the
national debt, then challenging its legal basis, should be prioritized by any gov-
ernment that seeks to solve the debt problem.
The first section of the paper presents the dynamics of Argentina’s debt since
1973. In the second, the debt-swap process conducted under successive Kirch-
ner governments after 2003, culminating in the 2014 ‘selective default’, is then
outlined. The following two sections analyse the contradictions between the
government’s debt-reduction policy and the growth of its national debt, includ-
ing its so-called ‘vulture funds’ dispute. The fifth section engages with recent
debates about whether alternatives exist, and the conclusion revives the proposal
that resurfaced during the recent Greek debt crisis, calling for the legitimacy of
national debt to be challenged. The feasibility of conducting a public audit of
Argentina’s national debt, followed by debt repudiation as a means for the
country to break from this cycle of dependence, is examined and then proposed.
Serial payers, serial losers? 125
1. A brief history of Argentina’s debt
Argentina has a long history of indebtedness since its independence in the nine-
teenth century (Basualdo, 2006). However, the debt’s structural relevance was
transformed during the military junta (1976–1983) which began a process of
opening the entire economy to global trade and capital flows. This left almost
every production decision in the hands of private agents. Across Latin
America dictatorships, including Argentina’s, took advantage of cheap loans
and borrowed heavily in order to finance their market reforms and also to main-
tain their military regimes. Yet when external conditions changed, Argentina
and her regional neighbours were left with enormous and virtually unpayable
foreign debts, culminating in a region-wide debt crisis in the 1980s (ILAS,
1986). These heavily indebted countries were left with little choice but to
request new loans from the IMF, which were provided under strict ‘condition-
alities’ which aimed to deepen the free-market reforms. These were later crys-
tallized into the ‘Washington Consensus’ reforms (Moreno-Brid et al., 2009),
which proponents argued would help control inflation and reduce debts but
which in reality provoked a new wave of domestic business closures, poverty,
unemployment and wage suppression.
Argentina’s dictatorship was able to ensure that certain aspects of marketiza-
tion and foreign debt dependence were to become apparently irreversible.2
Indebtedness became the axis upon which Argentina’s neoliberal reforms
turned (Basualdo, 2006). Capital inflows were facilitated through financial
and labour deregulation, which in time stimulated the acquisition of foreign
credit at low international interest rates. This allowed capital invested in the
local financial system to obtain high yields, which were later transferred
abroad, resulting in net financial outflows.
The injection of speculative investments also provided immediate liquidity to
bolster weakening currencies, such that exchange-rate devaluation could be
avoided. Foreign debt, then, played no role in encouraging productive invest-
ment, but instead represented a business opportunity in itself for international
speculators. In doing so, it promoted current and capital account disequilibrium
and unstable economic conditions. Systematic increases in debt repayments
(due to accrued interest) reached unsustainable levels in Latin America and
occasionally forced default (as in Argentina in 2001) and the need to renegotiate
with creditors. Similar dynamics have been repeated more recently in Greece
since 2010. This cycle of indebtedness may boost economic activity when
capital inflows are available but produces profound crisis when they are not.
Public indebtedness plays a central role in extending periods of structural
adjustment. Moreover, in Argentina, successive administrations have nationa-
lized private debt, thereby increasing public indebtedness.
At this juncture it is important to recognize that the way that successive Argen-
tinian governments have managed the economy and failed to control (and some-
times even themselves engaged in) corrupt financial practices has also aggravated
its national debt. Complicity in both supporting the military junta and in debt
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accrual from national banks, media and even the Catholic Church alongside
transnational corporations has recently come to light in a controversial but impor-
tant study edited byVerbitsky and Bohoslavsky (2015). Further, debt restructur-
ing negotiations and swaps have littered Argentina’s modern history but have
often been signed in order to secure short-term political capital from a preoccu-
pied electorate, whilst burdening state finances with unsustainable repayment
conditions in the longer term. Local actors cannot be absolved of responsibility
in the debt’s accumulation, although their role has not on its own been significant
enough to explain the intensity of the upward debt trajectory.
The dictatorship ended in a default, which newly elected President Raul
Alfonsín sought to confront in 1984 both through rescheduling debt payments
and proposing an audit of the illegitimately acquired debt from the dictatorship
era. However, facing significant external pressure, he was unable to do this, and
Argentina fell back into a debt crisis a few years later. President Menem then
restructured defaulted debt under the Brady Plan in 1989, paving the way for
further structural reforms. The explosive debt dynamics then led to numerous
renegotiations in 2000–2001, the twilight years of the decade-long convertibility
model (when the value of the peso was pegged to the US dollar). In each case,
despite short-term gains (including lower nominal debt value, longer repayment
terms or interest rate reductions), what prevailed was the continuity of the logic
of indebtedness, fully subscribed to by national agents.
In this vein President De la Rúa (1999–2001) completed three debt nego-
tiations. First, the ‘financial shield’ (December 2000), secured loans from
both international credit agencies and the Paris Club countries. Secondly, the
‘mega bond swap’ (June 2001) involved national government complicity in
the accumulation of the debt when Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo com-
mitted the debt’s very bondholders also to act as its underwriters. Designed to
ease short-term debt repayments by increasing medium-term debt, US$40
billion was added to Argentina’s debt, paying up to 17 per cent interest, and
handing over US$140 million in commissions to the foreign banks that
served as intermediaries in the deal (García, 2001; Levy Yeyati & Valenzuela,
2007). In November 2001, a third debt swap took place in which local
holders’ bonds were exchanged for new ones and were underwritten by the
state’s future tax revenues. This effectively mortgaged the nation’s future
fiscal revenue. However, the country’s access to external funding sources was
soon cut off by the IMF when budget-deficit targets were missed, triggering
a bank run as private savers (fearful of a debt default), rushed to withdraw
their dollar deposits until the government enacted the corralito. This
measure, enacted on 2 December 2001, effectively froze savers’ bank accounts
for 12 months to prevent further capital flight. Facing economic collapse, Pre-
sident De la Rúa resigned amidst social chaos. When interim President Adolfo
Rodriguez Saá was forced publicly to declare a debt default at the end of
December 2001 it exposed the government’s economic mismanagement
further. It became apparent that the Convertibility Plan had extenuated the
national debt crisis as the over-valued peso had generated successive trade
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deficits which had become unsustainable. De la Rúa resigned in the midst of an
economic and political crisis. The following section describes how the incoming
Kirchner governments (2003–2015) initiated a debt-reduction policy, and how
the latter generated several unintended consequences.
2. New features of debt management: pay only what is possible
After December 2001, nearly half of the public debt was defaulted on (US$82
billion); the other half had already been swapped in previous months.3 Interim
President Eduardo Duhalde (2002–2003) immediately began to negotiate the
restructuring of defaulted debt, while still paying international credit agencies
and honouring recently swapped debt commitments. According to his own
weekly Address to the Nation speeches,4 he understood debt, not as a
problem, but as serving to fuel productive business. Through the deepening
of national indebtedness, businesses would be able to access the necessary
credit to invest and produce. This was the same strategy that was pursued by
President Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007), who agreed to the 2005 debt swap
(Vázquez Valencia & Cantamutto, 2013), at the time the largest in financial
history. Within a few months, the government proposal to restructure the
debt had been agreed by 76 per cent of bondholders. There were several impor-
tant reasons why such a high proportion agreed to such a substantial write-
down. First, collective acceptance by retirement and pension fund managers
(who held nearly a fifth of eligible bonds) gave others the confidence also to
agree to the deal. Secondly, the passing of the ‘Lock Law’ (Law No. 26,017)
by Argentina’s legislature assured those entering into the swap that other inves-
tors would never be offered more favourable terms in future. Thirdly, the deal
reduced and harmonized the national jurisdictions applied to the bonds and the
currencies they were held in. This lowered the legal risk that bondholders were
exposed to by signing up. However, the main novelty was the promise of ‘bonus
dividends’ tied to Argentina’s economic performance (measured by GDP), so as
to make creditors ‘partners’ in its recovery (Macías Vázquez, 2008).
The Argentinian government presented this negotiation as an epic show-
down with speculative corporations in which the nominal value of the restruc-
tured bonds supposedly represented a ‘haircut’ of 75 per cent (Macías Vázquez,
2008). However, this achievement was greatly exaggerated. Once the capitaliza-
tion of expired interest is factored in, the write-offs were in fact only valued at
around 60 per cent of the total renegotiated part of the debt in question, and just
35 per cent of the entirety of the debt (Vázquez Valencia & Cantamutto, 2013).
Furthermore, when accounting for the fact that bondholders received their
GDP-linked bonus, thereby redirecting monies away from the Treasury (in a
context where Argentina’s GDP had grown by almost 50 per cent between
2003 and the 2010 swap), as well as the amount incurred in accumulated interest
payments after 2005, the value of the haircut was actually completely annulled
(Giuliano, 2015).
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It should be noted that this swap gained some supporters both in the IMF
and the then administration of President George W. Bush (La Nación, 2004)
because: (i) it closed – once again – the doors to a public debt audit which
may have exposed the illegality of many of the investments made in it (Balles-
tero, 2000); (ii) it preserved jurisdiction of the debt in foreign courts; (iii) being
linked to growth, it promised high returns; and (iv) it emulated the framework
used by private creditors during client bankruptcy proceedings, as the Meltzer
Report to Congress recommended (Macías Vázquez, 2008). With the deal
having drawn support from several representative bodies from the corporate
world, the 2005 restructure was hardly ‘a confrontation’ but more of an amicable
agreement (Vázquez Valencia & Cantamutto, 2013).
In doing so, President Kirchner had disregarded the outcome of the 2003
Argentine Workers’ Central Union (CTA)-organized public referendum, in
which 88 per cent of more than two million voters expressed opposition to
the payment of the debt (Echaide, 2005). He was also violating a court ruling
in the Olmos Case, in which the debt itself was declared ‘illegitimate, illegal
and odious’ by Federal Judge Ballestero (2000). The debt having resulted
from ‘477 separate fraudulent and arbitrary acts,’ Ballestero ruled that it
should thus not be paid (see section 5). Despite this, the President chose to
negotiate the payment of existing debt commitments in order to regain investor
confidence and the trust of credit markets, as expressed in a series of his public
speeches.
Another novelty of Kirchner’s swap was to promise to repay ‘no more than
the country could afford’ – a precept which has influenced government
policy and discourse ever since. After the deal was closed, national accounts
were once again characterized by rising interest and debt payments, which
would soon generate fiscal and balance of payments problems (Figure 1).
However, Argentina was still locked out of international capital markets (as it
had been since the 2001 default), so that few sources of finance entered the
country. Thus, and in contrast to the 1990s, Argentina was transformed into
a faithful debt payer without reaping the benefits of large capital inflows.
Government decrees that followed in 2005 reinforced the policy of ‘debt
reduction’. Decree 1,599/05 announced that ‘free reserves’ from Argentina’s
Central Bank (BCRA) would be used to make advance payments to international
credit agencies, as the government did when allocating US$9.8 billion (4.4 per
cent of GDP) to pay off its entire debt to the IMF in 2005. Amidst great fanfare,
President Kirchner declared at her official address to the nation on December 5
2005 that the country had regained ‘the freedom of national sovereignty’. The
official understanding of debt policy was that debt was not a problem, providing
that it helped boost investment.
This logic would be reinforced by President Cristina Kirchner in April 2010,
when she announced an agreement with three large banks (Barclays, Citigroup
and Deutsche Bank) to swap some of the remaining defaulted bonds from 2001
in exchange for fresh credit. To meet this agreement, Congress retracted the
Lock Law and allowed for the reopening of the old 2005 swap (Olmos
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Figure 1 Evolution of Argentina’s fiscal and current account positions.
Source: Argentina’s Central Bank, INDEC (2015) and World Bank (2015).
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Gaona, 2013). Having purchased the bonds at 20 per cent of their nominal
value, these banks stood to make significant capital earnings by swapping
them even after the write-downs. When this second swap was completed,
nearly 93 per cent of the 2001 defaulted debt had been restructured and normal-
ized. The government had reaffirmed that it was willing to change its own laws
to meet the requests of influential financial agents.
3. The ultimate effects of the ‘debt-reduction’ policy
Since the 2008 global economic crisis, the logic under which IMF conditionality
and structural adjustment programmes were tied to loans in Africa and Latin
America in the 1980s and 1990s has provided the inspiration behind the debt
bail-out packages that the ‘troika’ (IMF, ECB and Eurozone finance ministers)
has attached to recent loans made to Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal.
The global crisis has itself also impacted upon Argentina’s balance of pay-
ments in two ways: (i) by complicating short-term foreign direct investment
opportunities; and (ii) through an immediate fall in external demand for the
country’s exports, which was ultimately accompanied by a collapse in world
commodity prices. Argentina was disproportionately affected by this as it had
previously enjoyed a windfall in terms of primary export revenues (CEPAL,
2013).5 These contributed to severely limiting Argentina’s continued possibili-
ties for growth. Such scenarios commonly occur in periphery countries due to
conditions of ‘dependency’ under which reduced inflows of ‘strong’ currencies
(i.e. dollars, euros) constrain domestic businesses’ and consumers’ ability to
purchase goods and services that cannot be produced at home. In such situ-
ations, imports become prohibitively expensive, stunting economic activity.
Further, such scenarios reduce the value of the national currency as an effective
denomination in which to hold financial reserves. By 2013, after a decade of
such policies, the hidden debt problem began to unveil itself again in terms
of an economic slowdown. By 2014, the twin ‘current account’ and ‘fiscal’ sur-
pluses upon which Argentinian growth was predicated had both turned nega-
tive. They have remained so ever since (Figure 1).
The contradictory nature of the government’s debt-reduction policies has
become increasingly transparent. Partly as a consequence of the change in
global tendencies outlined above, 2014 witnessed a systematic social regression
in terms of government policy. Domestically, a 25 per cent peso devaluation
coincided with the halving of state subsidies for the supply of household gas,
aggravating already high inflation (The Economist, 2014). This orientation was
complemented with a rapprochement with foreign capital, in the hope of
winning back trust and boosting investment. That is why the Kirchner admin-
istration met a wide array of demands from foreign capital; for example, after
two years of litigation the government changed its strategy and announced
that the Spanish energy company REPSOL would be paid US$5.3 billion as
compensation for its partial renationalization.
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Equally, a ruling by the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) forced Argentina to pay US$677 million to a con-
sortium of corporations that had filed a complaint against it for protective
measures that the state had implemented over the previous 15 years. The gov-
ernment obediently accepted this ruling without a challenge. ICSID provides
the framework to facilitate the arbitration and conciliation of legal disputes
between international investors and states. However, the pattern of its dispute
settlement activities suggests a bias in favour of transnational companies and
against states, as it has ruled accordingly in two-thirds of cases (ICSID,
2014). For this reason, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela each decided to
withdraw from it. Yet, although Argentina is the single country taken most
frequently to these tribunals by international investors (ICSID, 2014), the
path chosen by Cristina Kirchner’s government diverged from these other
Latin American states, accepting ICSID verdicts in order to demonstrate its
investor-friendly business environment and to enable access to new sources
of credit.
This policy of seeking to placate foreign investors was in further evidence a
few months later when Argentina signed a deal with the Paris Club of creditor
countries to repay a debt that was originally generated during the military dic-
tatorship and the fraudulent 2001 debt swaps. Between that year’s debt default
and the payment settlement in 2014, the debt owed to the Club had grown by 60
per cent, reaching a total of US$9.7 billion (2 per cent of GDP). Unlike the 2005
swap, this time no attempts were made to achieve any write-down.
Meanwhile, there was one issue that was proving almost impossible to
resolve: the litigation being pursued by the ‘hold-out’ bondholders (largely
North American hedge funds) who had refused to enter the debt restructuring
process in what the Financial Times had described as the ‘sovereign debt trial of
the century’. This process took a dramatic turn in the US courts where two
‘vulture funds’6 achieved several unprecedented legal victories. Judge
Thomas Griesa’s order that Argentina pay NML Capital and Aurelius
Capital Management US$1.3 billion in December 2012 was later upheld by
different Appeal Courts. Yet throughout the case – and despite the fact that
the Argentinian government consistently had demonstrated its willingness to
repay its creditors – the judge treated Argentina as an ‘incorrigible debtor’.
In doing so, the judge ignored the reality of the country’s ‘repay-as-much-as-
possible’ actions that had defined the Néstor and Cristina Kirchner govern-
ments’ stance towards the national debt since 2003.
However, while the case was preceding, the two vulture funds which had
brought the lawsuit (but which themselves owned just 1.5 per cent of Argenti-
na’s bonds),7 relentlessly hounded the Argentinian government for payment,
even establishing a lobby group in Washington DC to argue their case there.
‘American Task Force Argentina’ conducted a campaign against Argentina
which included agitating for its ejection from the G20 and lobbying the
World Bank not to provide any further loans. Indeed, it has spent US$4
million persuading US congressmen to support these campaigns (Johnston,
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2012), leveraging the bondholders’ multi-billion dollar assets to subvert the
democratic process in its favour.
Yet if Argentina had faithfully abided by the principle of ‘repay-as-much-as-
possible’ to its creditors up until this point, why then did it stand firm in refus-
ing to pay the vulture funds and appealing Judge Griesa’s ruling? Payment of
US$1.3 billion was, after all, easily affordable for a country with US$27
billion of reserves at the time. What explains the divergence from this aspect
of its foreign and economic policy is that the government was bound by what
is known as a pari passu clause (meaning ‘equal treatment’) – a standard part
of most international borrowing agreements by domestic governments. In
other words, all investors must be offered the same repayment terms by their
debtor. However, Judge Griesa (and the US Court of Appeals) took a very
broad interpretation of this clause, ruling that if Argentina made any further
payments to the swap participants under their restructured terms, it would
also have to pay what it owed to the hold-outs in full. However, because of
another clause in the bond contracts – RUFO (Rights Upon Future Offers) –
if NML and Aurelius were subsequently paid in full, then the 93 per cent of
the country’s bondholders that had agreed to debt write-downs would also be
entitled to sue Argentina for the original amount of their debt bonds. If pari
passu was applied retrospectively, it could have left the Argentinian state with
an insurmountable bill of US$200 billion (the total value of the 2005 and
2010 debt swaps plus interest and penalties) which would have forced it into
a debt default again and ignited a crisis potentially as serious as that of 2001.
While the RUFO clause expired in January 2015, Argentina’s government
did not rush to an arrangement with creditors, presumably because of the dom-
estic political fall-out that would have ensued, given it had made the case the
centrepiece of the role it was projecting to the Argentinian public as the defen-
der of national interests against predatory attacks from foreign investors.
On 16 June 2014, the US Supreme Court rejected Argentina’s final appeal,
thus vindicating Griesa’s original pro-creditor resolution. In the gambit that fol-
lowed, when the next interest payment of US$539 million to the restructured
bondholders was due at the end of June 2014, Argentina had already deposited
this sum into its bank account, ready for transfer to them. However, Judge
Griesa ruled that, given the government had not yet paid the hold-out funds,
this move was a violation of his court ruling. He therefore blocked the transfer,
and on 30 July 2014, despite Argentina’s willingness and capacity to make
repayments, credit ratings agency Standard and Poor declared the country to
have fallen into partial debt default for the second time in 13 years.
It should be said that the outcome of the trial had several major repercussions
for the global debt system. Firstly, it established a precedent in international
financial law under which the right of speculative hedge fund managers to
pursue multi-million dollar profits by suing sovereign governments supersedes
the latter’s right to protect their people by instead spending such resources on
health, education, social programmes or other public goods. Secondly, it may
render future debt restructurings impossible anywhere in the world because
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it removes any incentive for creditors to agree to debt swaps, knowing that they
can now successfully pursue full payment for the original promised sum in
‘friendly’ foreign courts in New York or other financial centres (Ozarow,
2014). It is worth noting that vulture fund Dart Management has already
made a €100 million profit on Greek debt and at least a dozen other such
funds are currently speculating on it (Porzecanski & Verlaine, 2015). Mean-
while, Puerto Rico represents the latest battlefield for these investors, and the
Ad Hoc group of hedge funds alone owns US$4.5 billion of its debt (Dayen,
2016). Many ‘vulture funds’ like Aurelius operate internationally and have
become a common enemy of indebted governments, whether in the global
South or North.
Finally, the ruling not only jeopardizes debt-swap negotiations that are
currently taking place in Greece and other European countries, but also
impacts upon any indebted countries’ future access to credit. In the face
of threats to switch off their credit taps, Argentina has not only garnered
the support of moderate heterodox scholars such as Paul Krugman and
Dani Rodrik, but also that of the neo-classical laureate Robert Solow as
well as the Organization of American States, President Obama and even
the IMF and the World Bank. Their concern that such a move would paral-
yse credit and, simultaneously, the motor of neoliberal consumerism,
prompted such support from these unexpected quarters. It would after all
be self-defeating for global finance, which requires injections of credit for
the wheels of the system to keep turning.
Argentina therefore found itself returning to a debt crisis, with the 2001
episode having never been fully resolved. The limits and internal contradictions
of the official policy of ‘debt reduction’ have been exposed, and the government
will at some point be obliged – by its own logic – once again to restructure its
debt. The following section elaborates on how financial capitalism’s global archi-
tecture has ensured structural continuities pre- and post-2001 which help to
explain the default’s (re)occurrence in Argentina.
4. Serial payers, serial losers
Fourteen years after Argentina’s monumental 2001 default, the country once
again finds itself with rising levels of debt, running out of currency reserves
and in a so-called ‘technical’ debt default. So what did the Kirchner govern-
ment’s ‘debt-reduction’ policy accomplish? It can point to three achievements:
(i) a fall in the debt-to-GDP ratio from 127 per cent to 46 per cent between 2005
and 2014 (INDEC); (ii) a reduction in the proportion of public debt owned by
foreign creditors (from 25 per cent in 2005 to 13 per cent in 2012); and (iii) a
dramatic increase in the proportion of debt owned by state agencies such as
BCRA and ANSES (Argentina’s social security agency) as opposed to private
investors. This proportion now totals 60 per cent and represents an enormous
increase from just 8 per cent in 2005 (all figures from INDEC). Here, the
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Kirchner government’s claim that Argentina has thus achieved greater ‘sover-
eignty’ will be interrogated.
With regard to the first argument, its low explanatory power must be noted
because the debt-to-GDP ratio does not accurately represent the proportion of
debt liabilities that are sanctionable if they are not honoured. In fact, this figure
was only 65 per cent just before the 2001 default (INDEC), but was nevertheless
sufficient to spark a profound crisis. The actual proportion of Argentinian
bonds that are currently held by privately owned companies which have the
option of pursuing litigation against the state in the event of non-payment
stands at 40 per cent. This figure is smaller than in 2001 but does not
prevent the possibility of a crisis.
In relation to the second argument, the considerable reduction of the burden
of foreign-held debt merits further attention because it is this which represents
an important and historic point of departure from previous episodes of national
debt crisis. Indeed, this has meant a reduction in the need to earn foreign cur-
rency to meet debt repayments. Yet, important questions remain about this
change in the debt’s composition.
It must be highlighted that the fall in this ratio largely results not from the
Argentinian government’s design, but due to the impossibility of obtaining
external sources of credit, given that the country has been locked out of inter-
national capital markets since the 2001 default. To this end, the government’s
‘debt-reduction’ policy failed, because throughout the last decade it was
unable to regain access to global financial markets. This was the case despite
Argentina’s doing all it could to persuade international financial institutions
of its reputation as a ‘serial payer’.
On the third ‘achievement’, the reconstituting of the debt from foreign to
domestic sources has actually proved enormously costly for Argentina. Excep-
tionally high interest rates were charged on its domestic, peso-denominated
bonds even when these were converted into dollars due to the daily inflation
adjustment (known as the Stabilization Reference Coefficient). Meanwhile,
the GDP-linked payment bonus that its post-restructure creditors now enjoy
has seen the Treasury deprived of hundreds of millions of dollars. Financial
agents (both national and foreign) have thus generated extraordinary profits
in Argentina and continue to constitute the country’s most profitable sector.
To ensure debt payments to creditors, the government has issued a series of
new bonds via various state agencies, including BCRA, ANSES, the National
Bank and even the National Lottery. Whilst the government correctly
claimed that transferring national debt to public agencies would facilitate
future negotiations, the detrimental effects of such a scenario were that state
agencies lost resources that should have been dedicated to the services they
provide to the public. For example, instead of buying government bonds,
ANSES could have directed resources to paying higher pensions in a context
in which almost three-quarters of Argentina’s pensioners are paid sub-
poverty line pensions. Instead these resources are now at least partially chan-
nelled into paying what will later be described as ‘an illegal debt’.
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A further element of the debt-repayment policy was added when the Argen-
tinian Senate changed the Central Bank statues in 2012 so that its reserves could
be used to repay public debt whenever the government decreed. This dimin-
ished the Bank’s ‘independence’. As Figure 2 illustrates, it also eroded the
national currency reserves that back up the peso – which fell from US$52
billion in 2011 to US$27 billion in 2014.
The effect since then has been perpetual currency devaluation,8 and, aside
from having suffered speculative attacks, the peso has been further weakened
by the simultaneous haemorrhaging of reserves and outflow of dollars in the
form of debt payments to foreign creditors. The need to return to a trade
surplus and export competitiveness on global markets in order to obtain
foreign currency in a context of low investment seems only achievable
through successive peso devaluations. Yet this has also seen wage-earners’ pur-
chasing power erode (as imported goods become more expensive to buy and
increased production costs are also passed on to the consumer).9
As the Kirchner government struggled to balance the books and tighten its
budget deficits to help reduce the debt, it was forced to cut public spending
elsewhere. The political and social costs of doing so were extremely high. It
became increasingly frugal in its wage negotiations; public-sector wages
remain 35 per cent below their real-terms levels compared to 2001 (López &
Cantamutto, 2013), and, although the government began to clamp down on cor-
porate tax evasion towards the end of its mandate, attempts to fulfil debt-repay-
ment obligations inevitably involved attacks on workers’ rights and wages,
eventually facing general strikes from its former union allies in 2012 and 2014.
Yet perhaps the most important reason why the supposed ‘increase in sover-
eignty’ bestowed by a shift in Argentina’s creditors from foreign to domestic
sources is exaggerated is the extremely high foreign ownership of the country’s
productive infrastructure. Often its domestic debt-buyers are local subsidiaries
of large transnational firms like Citibank, BBVA, Deutsche Bank and Barclays.
That is to say, in reality some of the debt is now owned by the very same foreign
creditors who supposedly no longer own it. This has had a negative impact on
the current account and balance of payments.
In a series of public addresses from 26 August 2013, President Cristina
Kirchner boasted that her government had elevated the country to the status
of ‘serial payer’ of its debt liabilities and would thus honour any justifiable finan-
cial claim made by a creditor. She explained that Argentina had made US$192
billion in repayments since 2003 (which, the authors note, represents 125 per
cent of the full repayment of the nominal debt value). However, using official
INDEC figures, the debt still rose in absolute terms from US$145 billion in
2001 to US$200 billion in mid-2014 and remained at approximately the same
level in real terms (Figure 3). In other words, the central ‘achievement’ of
paying off the illegitimate debt has been the accumulation of more debt. It is
worth remarking that this official estimate of the current debt does not
include numerous liabilities such as the multi-billion dollar debts of Argentina’s
provincial government administrations, provisions for interest and GDP-linked
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Figure 2 Argentina’s currency reserves (US$ millions).
Source: INDEC (2015).
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bonus payments, as well as the debt liabilities of publicly owned enterprises.
Further, the debt calculation does not account for the amount owed to the
vulture funds following their victory in the US courts. Héctor Giuliano esti-
mates the real debt (including these liabilities) to be closer to US$300 billion,
far higher than in 2001.10
A reflection should be offered here on the implications of the recent elec-
tion of President Mauricio Macri for the prospects for Argentina’s debt.
First, Macri has recognized the Kirchners’s debt-policy achievements (i.e.
the ones referred to in this section) but has also said that a rapprochement
with foreign capital would enable the state to regain access to the credit
markets. Secondly, one of his first announcements was the securing of a
new series of loans, including at least US$5 billion from private banks (JP
Morgan, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, HSBC and Goldman Sachs) and US$2
billion thanks to a new dollar-denominated bond, for which Argentina will
be charged 7.8 per cent annual interest. The Economy Minister, Alfonso
Prat-Gay, and Finance Secretary, Luis Caputo, both former managers – of
JP Morgan and Deutsche, respectively – are responsible for these nego-
tiations. Perhaps most significantly of all, at the time of writing they were
promising a US$6.5 billion payment settlement with New York ‘vulture
funds’ (Gillespie, 2016).
5. Challenging an illegitimate, illegal and odious debt
One of the most significant consequences of the outcome of Argentina’s legal
battle against the ‘vulture funds’ – with other recent global struggles – was
that it heightened awareness within civil society and among governments glob-
ally about the dangers of the unregulated nature of international financial capit-
alism. In particular, it became evident that indebted economies and those facing
debt crises were being increasingly exposed to attacks by vulture speculators.
Congo, Peru, Zambia and several others have discovered this to their cost in
recent years. In an almost unprecedented show of strength, in September
2014 the governments of the 133 countries belonging to the G77 Group of
Nations united with China to demand profound changes to how the inter-
national debt system functions. Led by the Argentinian government, these
countries forced through a UNGeneral Assembly vote to establish a multilateral
framework to regulate excessive financial speculation and rewrite national debt
restructuring rules. A year later, on 10 September 2015, the General Assembly
approved a draft resolution on ‘Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructur-
ing Processes’ (A/69/L.84) in which nine principles were established that
should be respected when restructuring sovereign debt: sovereignty, good
faith, transparency, impartiality, equitable treatment, sovereign immunity,
legitimacy, sustainability and majority restructuring (UNCTAD, 2015). It is
hoped that the Principles will ensure that, when national debts can no longer
be paid, scenarios under which prolonged debt crises and expensive bank
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Figure 3 Argentina’s public debt 1998–2014 (US$ billions).
Source: INDEC (2015).
S
erialpayers,seriallosers?
139
bail-outs result might be avoided in part by proscribing vulture funds’ extortion
of governments.
Yet this development does little either to (i) reverse the mounting existing
debt burden of developing countries – which has doubled to US$5 trillion
since the 2005 G8 Summit debt write-offs (World Bank, 2014, p. 2), or (ii)
permit semi-peripheral states like Argentina to seek the necessary external
finance to uphold its central role as a health, education and social protection pro-
vider without perpetuating the dependence upon Western institutions like the
IMF, the Paris Club and the hedge funds that have so profoundly harmed their
country’s development.
Of the alternatives, Argentina is faced with four options (Ozarow, 2014). Its
favoured approach appears to match that of many global south countries: closer
trade and investment co-operation with China. Indeed, its Eastern ally recently
displaced the United States and European countries to become Argentina’s
second largest trading partner after Brazil. In 2014 it also received a US$7.5
billion loan from the China Development Bank, with a further loan of US$11
billion pledged over three years to bolster its ailing currency reserves (World
Politics Review, 2015). However, as China asserts its political and economic
authority in Argentina and Latin America, it presents the danger that policy
continuity will mean that past relationships of dependence on Western financial
institutions and G8 countries will simply be replicated.
The second option is the recently-founded BRICS development bank.
However, as details emerge of its borrowing arrangements, debtor countries
like Argentina would be left with little room to change its financial status or
dependence on Western international financial institutions. According to
Article 5.d.ii of its July 2015 Contingent Reserve Arrangement, requesting
parties would require an existing ‘on-track-arrangement’ with the IMF ‘based
on conditionality’ in order to qualify for 70 per cent of possible financial assist-
ance (BRICS, 2015). The BRICS bank certainly would not represent the
counter-hegemonic institution that many development economists hope for.
Both these options depend upon Argentina’s implementation of neoliberal
market reforms, which would ultimately reaffirm its position as a peripheral
state in the global division of labour.
A third, more politically palatable alternative would be to seek financing from
the Bank of the South (Banco del Sur). Argentina established this alternative
lending institution in 2009 alongside its regional and political allies Venezuela,
Brazil, Paraguay, Ecuador, Bolivia and Uruguay as a direct response to their
rejection of the World Bank and IMF’s enforcement of free market reforms
as a condition of emergency loans. Whilst favourable lending terms would be
offered for infrastructure projects and financing of social programmes, progress
towards establishing this alternative regional banking project has stalled as it
awaits ratification by several states. These difficulties were compounded by
the ascendency of Mauricio Macri as Argentina’s President in December
2015. His hostility to the project, his attempts to get Venezuela ejected from
regional trading block Mercosur and the defeat of President Maduro in
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Venezuela’s recent legislative elections have placed Banco del Sur’s future in
serious doubt. Macri’s agenda is explicit: to seek an improved trade and invest-
ment relationship with the United States and the European Union which will be
prioritized over Argentina’s Latin American partners.
The remaining possibility – one that this paper supports – was first proposed
by Argentina’s social organizations in the post-dictatorship milieu11 and was
partially recognized by former President Raul Alfonsín in the 1980s: a national
public audit of Argentina’s debt to determine the amount that can be deemed to
be ‘illegitimate’ or plainly illegal. This would activate Judge Ballestero’s long-
neglected 2000 court ruling, whilst additionally accounting for the potentially
fraudulent 2001 mega bond swap. The resulting figure would then be cancelled.
Alleviating the debt burden in this way would help the government regain
sovereignty over its political and economic affairs.
Federal Judge Jorge Ballestero’s ruling in The Olmos case (Ballestero, 2000)
confirmed the ‘illegal, predatory and illegitimate’ character of the borrowing
process of Argentina’s debt, initially accrued under the military dictatorship
(1976–1983). The government at the time had no constitutional right nor
popular mandate to acquire foreign debt as it did not observe its constitutional
obligation to consult Congress before doing so. Also, as civil society organiz-
ations have claimed, the loans financed a military government engaged in acts
which breached international human rights law, further bringing the legitimacy
of the original loans into question. Finally, missing legal documents and incom-
plete registers of debt commitments provide further arguments for the non-
payment of foreign debt on the grounds of its illegitimacy and potential illegality
(Ballestero, 2000).
The debt’s illegitimate jurisprudence and anatocism (usury which consists of
charging interest payments upon existing interest) mean its questionable origins
have subsequently been recycled, placing doubt on the legality of the accrual of
more recent national debt. The core legal principle is that no illicit action can
later serve as the basis for a ‘legal’ act. On that premise, if the original debt-
swap bonds are deemed illegal, this nullifies the value of investments made in
the debt, including NML Capital and Aurelius bond purchases after Argenti-
na’s 2001 economic crisis (Olmos Gaona, 2011).12
Yet, although Judge Ballestero’s ruling was remitted to the National Congress
to consider the judgment and legislate on the matter by constitutional mandate,
14 years passed without any action being taken. That was until September 2014
when the new Sovereign Payments Law (Law No. 26,984), ordered the estab-
lishment of a Permanent Bicameral Commission to Investigate the Origins of the
Nation’s External Debt. However, the Commission had two weaknesses. On the
one hand, its remit does not cover the period of the Kirchnerist debt swaps from
2005 onwards, and, on the other, this Commission was created under a law that
declares the paying of all debt to be ‘in the public interest’ before its findings are
even known. This suggests that it has not been established with the end of ‘non-
payment of illegitimate debt’ in mind. However, in the current belle époque of
innovation with respect to global debt regulation, momentum is building
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among civil society actors for such an audit. One umbrella group of campaign
organizations and trade unions (The Assembly for the Suspension of Payments
and Investigation of the Debt) organized a major international conference in
June 2015 to contest Argentina’s repayment policy and demand that a full
audit be performed. By December 2015, the unworkable Commission had no
results to show, as one of its member denounced (ACTA, 2015).
Yet the undertaking of public debt audits has not only proved feasible, but has
also resulted in successful outcomes in recent years. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa’s
administration created a debt-audit commission in 2008 which confirmed two-
thirds of the national debt as being illegal and illegitimate. Much of this debt
was thereafter unilaterally cancelled and, through partial default and selective
bond buy-back, the country’s debt burden was slashed by US$3 billion
(Denvir, 2008). Contrary to the predictions of international markets, Ecuador rep-
resents one of the fastest-growing economies in the region (CEPAL, 2013). Mean-
while, in June 2015 the Greek Debt Truth Commission (established by its
government) found the debt accumulated between 2010 and 2014 to be ‘illegal,
illegitimate and odious’ in character13 and thus concluded that it should not be
paid. Its findings have yet to be acted upon by the Syriza government.
6. Concluding remarks: the case for moving from ‘repayment’ to
‘non-payment’
Argentina’s overall public debt burden has increased during the last 15 years.
Notably, its transfer from external to domestic holders is spurious following a
financial sleight-of-hand by which the shift in the debt burden from private
external creditors to domestic creditors was made by paying ‘as much as poss-
ible’ in order to begin a new round of indebtedness. This presents a serious
danger to the country’s long-term economic sustainability.
The argument supported in this paper is that only by challenging the legiti-
macy and the legality of the debt on the grounds already discussed can the see-
mingly irreversible trajectory of debt accumulation be countered. Yet
Kirchnerist government policy at best repeatedly failed to question the debt’s
dubious origins (and legality) and at worst was actively complicit in reaffirming
its legitimacy through its ‘debt-reduction’ policy. Accepting the transfer of jur-
isdiction to foreign courts during the debt swaps was also an error in this regard.
Responsibility for Argentina’s spiralling debt crisis has been as much due to
Néstor and Cristina Kirchner’s failings as it has been to the pressure of inter-
national capital.
What was once a political taboo among the establishment parties in Argentina –
unilaterally to declare a debt default, suspend all payments and force new nego-
tiations – was gaining political traction until the election of President Macri in
November 2015, although away from elite actor level momentum continues to
grow among the country’s religious, labour and civil society organizations. Unsur-
prisingly, Argentina’s Debt Commission had nothing to show.
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Further, while the Sovereign Payments Law questions the debt’s legitimacy,
paradoxically it also reasserts the government’s obligation to repay it. Rather
than accepting the domestic court’s already-established findings about the
debt’s illegitimacy dating back to the Olmos case (Ballestero, 2000), this Law
calls for a re-auditing of the debt once again on entirely different terms.
Given the Commission’s failure to investigate, a ‘citizens’ audit’ might be
more opportune. It would also serve both as an educational tool for the popu-
lation to understand the illegitimate, odious and illegal character of the nation’s
debt as well as to aid citizens in exerting political pressure on their government
unilaterally to cancel part of its debt.
Greece’s default on an IMF loan repayment in June 2015 and Puerto Rico’s
January 2016 default highlight the increasing concern that debt crises pose in
Europe and North America. Support for public debt audits as a means by
which citizens can start to emancipate themselves from the debt burden – as the
international coalition Jubilee 2000 has proposed for many years – is also
growing in the global North. In Iceland, citizens voted to refuse to nationalize
their banks’ foreign debts, and they have gained significantly. The economy is cur-
rently booming and unemployment is down to 2 per cent (Valdimarsson, 2014).
Norway’s government recently conducted an audit into debts owed to it and has
cancelled those arising from loans it made for other countries to purchase its
exports which were deemed potentially ‘dangerous’ at the time they were made.
Even in France, a citizen’s audit found 60 per cent of its public debt to be illegi-
timate. Public debt audits are feasible, and refusing to pay does not have to mean
financial armageddon. Of course, to perform these audits and advocate non-
payment, the structures of national and global power must simultaneously be
radically reformed. This presents its own problems, which must be dealt with
elsewhere. The audit is offered as a starting-point for this discussion.
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Notes
1 Although ‘neoliberalism’ has been criticized because of its conceptual ambiguities
and contradictions (Venugopal, 2015), and described as a sequenced, fragmented and
politically indeterminate process (Molyneux, 2008), the term can still be defined
within certain parameters. In this paper, ‘neoliberalism’ refers to the specific stage of
late capitalism which started in the late 1970s, whereby transnational firms won economic
and political power over labour – i.e. a reassertion of capitalist class power (Harvey,
2005). This historical shift was framed by market-friendly structural reforms (mainly
external account liberalization, the state’s withdrawal from its productive role and
from providing labour and welfare protections). Notwithstanding various setbacks, in
terms of achieving its aims it has proved a largely successful model, although the
project remains unfinished.
2 It has been argued that these reforms naturalized citizens’ beliefs in the idealized
market (Fridman, 2010).
3 Unless another source is quoted, the data included in this paper are based on official
data available from Argentina’s National Statistics Institute, INDEC. For a discussion of
their accuracy, see Giuliano (2015).
4 Throughout 2002, President Duhalde explained his policies to the nation in a short
weekly intervention on National Public Radio, named ‘Talking with the President’.
5 Two ‘impossibility theorems’ have delayed a more consequent and aggressive fiscal
expansion in the core economies, exerting a negative effect on global economic growth
(Lysandrou, 2013), which in turn has lessened their demand for peripheral economies’
goods.
6 ‘Vulture fund’ is the term their detractors use to describe hedge funds that speculate
on the distressed debt of countries which face defaults by purchasing bonds with the
specific intention of suing the debtor country for the full bond amount in order to
make exorbitant profits years later when restructuring negotiations begin.
7 In total 7 per cent of all Argentina’s bondholders were ‘hold-outs’, including those
who did not directly pursue litigation.
8 The official exchange rate against the US dollar fell from 4 pesos in 2011 to 9.60
pesos in November 2015 (x-rates.com) while the ‘blue’ (unofficial) dollar rate stood at
14.50 pesos. After President Macri took office, both exchange rates were unified, at
approximately 13.30 pesos per dollar. This followed an official devaluation of 30 per
cent in December 2015.
9 We are not trying to explain the Argentinian inflationary process due to currency
devaluation alone; the reasons are clearly multi-causal.
10 For further details on debt values and proportions, see Giuliano (2015).
11 Human rights organizations and left-wing parties denounced the military dictator-
ship for having engaged in external debt accumulation to part-finance its repressive pol-
icies. They claimed that the loans were used to fund a regime that engaged in widespread
torture, murder and genocidal practices against the population as part of the National
Security Doctrine under which 30,000 citizens were ‘disappeared’. Later, a judicial
investigation would substantiate these claims (Ballestero, 2000).
12 Some studies have since sought to explain the existence of international law juris-
prudence in order to claim the illegal and illegitimate character of debt (Toussaint &
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Millet, 2010), but this effort has yet to win the attention of researchers and – moreover –
of politicians.
13 An executive summary may be found at http://cadtm.org/Executive-Summary-
of-the-report.
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